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4Abstract:
Trade between the European Union (EU) and the Transition Economies (TE) is increasingly
characterised by intra-industry trade. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal
and vertical shares reveals predominantly vertical structures with decisively more quality
advantages for the EU and less quality advantages for TE countries whenever trade has been
liberalised. Empirical research on factors determining this structure in an EU-TE framework
lags behind theoretical and empirical research on horizontal and vertical trade in other regions
of the world. The main objective of this paper is therefore to contribute to the ongoing debate
on EU-TE trade structures by offering an explanation of vertical trade. We utilise a cross-
country approach in which relative wage differences, country size and income distribution
play a leading role. We find first that relative differences in wages (per capita income) and
country size explain intra-industry trade when trade is vertical and completely liberalised, and
second that cross country differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We
conclude that EU firms have been able to increase their  product quality and to shift low-
quality segments to TE countries. This may suggest a product-quality cycle prevalent in EU-
TE trade.
JEL Classification F13, F14, F15
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5Introduction*
This paper investigates intra-industry trade (IIT) between the European Union (EU) and
countries in transition (TE), the purpose being to find an explanation for the emerging trade
pattern between the two regions. We test a model in which intra-industry trade takes place in
both vertically and horizontally differentiated products. The distinctive feature of intra-
industry trade is product quality. A major challenge faced by the TEs is upgrading quality in
order to withstand the competition raised by the superior commodities produced by EU firms.
Emerging trade patterns can be best explained in the absence of trade barriers. However, since
such a condition is rare, we examine two panels of EU-TE trade, liberalised in one case and
non-liberalised in the other The results of such analysis may indicate whether trade
liberalisation stimulates upgrading and catching-up or whether some policy support is
necessary.
The empirical specification is based on a product-quality cycle (Flam and Helpman, 1987)
that adds income distribution patterns to the usual explanatory country variables, like country
size, relative income or wage differences between countries. The empirical analysis concerns
the years 1997 and 2000 and  four TE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia. We further divide trade into two  panels. Trade in panel A was completely
liberalized  in 1993, and trade in the items in panel B gradually underwent liberalisation after
1996.
The paper is organised as follows. Section Two provides some stylised facts on intra-industry
trade. A significant fraction of EU-TE trade is vertically differentiated, and product flows
between both sets of countries show a significant quality cycle. Section Three describes the
problems of explaining intra-industry trade identified in the relevant literature. We highlight
controversial results obtained by the country and industry approaches, arguing that in both
cases the main problem is the lack of attention paid either to liberalised/non-liberalised trade
flows or to the different components of IIT – horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (VIIT) trade. We
utilize a product-quality-cycle model of VIIT consisting of country factors and test it in
Section Four, finding that relative country differences in GDP per capita, in size and in
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6income inequality exert important and different effects on the shares of vertical and horizontal
intra-industry trade. An even clearer result emerges when flows are considered separately,
particularly as regards the determinants of VIIT in liberalised trade. Section Five concludes,
providing some policy implications.
1. Stylised facts on intra-industry trad between EU and TE
The integration of TEs and EU countries has been characterised in the past decade by
trade integration and various features of structural change.
In general, the emerging pattern of trade is characterised by:
(1) increased intra-industry trade,
(2) the dominance of vertical trade1, and
(3) the dominance of quality differences in trade.
Trade liberalisation has exerted a strong influence on the trade pattern. Liberalisation
has been concentrated in manufacturing, and trade in some items was completely liberalized
at an early stage of integration; for other items, liberalisation has proceeded step by step. By
referring to provisions in the European Agreements with the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, we identified  a set of chapters of the Combined Nomenclature with
different degrees of liberalisation between 1993 and 2000.  The chapters selected represent
about 26 per cent of  total trade by the EU with the four TE countries in 1993, and 31 per cent
in 2000  (for more details including Table A1, see the Annex).
We found that the share of IIT in trade in all the selected categories of the Combined
Nomenclature was between 25 per cent for Poland and 58 per cent for the Czech
Republic in 2000 (Table 1), calculated with unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices. The share
increased in all
                                                                                                                                                                                    
final draft, to Karin Szalai and Peter Schäfer (both Halle) for preparing the data on income distribution (Karin)
and intra-industry trade (Peter). Responsibility for the study, of course, remains ours alone.
1 See also Burgstaller and Landesmann (1997), Aturupane et al. (1997),  Rosati (1998), Gabrisch and Werner
(1998), Thom (1999), and Gabrisch and Segnana (2001). For analysis of the different distributive
consequences of vertical and horizontal trade see Facchini and Segnana (2002).
7cases with respect to the share in 1993. Balanced trade is, however, a basic
assumption of all models that explain IIT. There is a large body of literature which
discusses the flaws in the unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd index and suggests various
alternatives.2 In addition to unadjusted indices we used adjusted Grubel-Lloyd
indices that corrected for the overall trade imbalances (high EU surplus in our case):
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where GL is the adjusted share of intra-industry trade in the total trade of n
industries, Xi and Mi are  the exports and imports of the individual industry i. The
second element in the denominator is the factor correcting for the overall trade
imbalance. We found that the shares of IIT were remarkably higher in trade with all
four countries compared to the unadjusted shares.
                                                          
2 Various adjustments to trade imbalances have been proposed and criticized by several authors; see for instance
Vona (1991).
8Table 1: Grubel-Lloyd indices of intra-industry trade between EU(15) and TE(4), 1993, 1997, and 2000
TE year unadjusted adjusted
Panel A+B
1993 0.383 0.584
1997 0.521 0.711CzechRepublic
2000 0.583 0.728
1993 0.366 0.377
1997 0.412 0.438Hungary
2000 0.461 0.497
1993 0.199 0.291
1997 0.198 0.382Poland
2000 0.246 0,.357
1993 0.236 0.312
1997 0.291 0.376Slovakia
2000 0.383 0.415
Panel A
1993 0.304 0.823
1997 0.497 0.848CzechRepublic
2000 0.600 0.846
1993 0.408 0.648
1997 0.539 0.772Hungary
2000 0.550 0.715
1993 0.238 0.957
1997 0.172 0.992Poland
2000 0.241 0.454
1993 0.254 0.890
1997 0.352 0.875Slovakia
2000 0.531 0.758
Panel B
1993 0.506 0.565
1997 0.563 0.567CzechRepublic
2000 0.551 0.557
1993 0.355 0.375
1997 0.372 0.377Hungary
2000 0.426 0.432
1993 0.164 0.175
1997 0.229 0.243Poland
2000 0.253 0.267
1993 0.221 0.264
Slovakia
1997 0.230 0.270
2000 0.226 0.268
Source: Own calculations on EUROSTAT data.
Data for EU(15) 1993 include data for Austria, Sweden and Finland from 1995.
9Over time, adjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices show a significant increase of IIT in EU
trade with all four TE countries compared with the unadjusted indices. This highly
dynamic change prompts the question as to which factors determine it. An initial
answer is that it may be caused by a combination of trade liberalisation (due to the
trade agreements since 1992) with comparative advantages, both of which are
possibly reflected in the high EU surplus in the period under consideration. Since the
difference between liberalised and non-liberalised trade was most pronounced in the
period 1993-2000, we split our data set into two panels: panel A comprised all items
whose trade was completely liberalised between EU and TE in 1993. The adjustment
period lasted seven years. Panel A typically included industries which are
particularly attractive to foreign direct investors. Panel B consisted of selected items
whose trade started to be liberalised in 1996. The adjustment period for firms was
shorter than in panel A, and the still existing trade barriers should have had an
impact on the trade pattern. Panel B included mainly textiles and clothing. In some of
these industries, outward processing trade (OPT) might have had an influence on
trade flows. The distinction between OPT and FDI is important insofar as both
strategies at the firm level influence the emergence of trade structures in different
ways: as is well known, investments create new production, while OPT utilises
existing production.
Assuming that the EU has a pronounced comparative advantage in liberalised
commodities, we would expect larger imbalances in panel A than in panel B and,
consequently, higher IIT shares. The data confirmed this expectation. IIT shares were
significantly greater in panel A than in panel B. The gap between the unadjusted and
the adjusted shares was far larger in panel A than in panel B, and the increase in
adjusted shares also turned out to be somewhat weaker in B than in A. Thus, the first
conclusion is this: When trade is liberalised and when one side has a comparative
advantage, this advantage exerts a more pronounced impact on IIT than it does
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under less liberalised conditions. Which kind of  advantage this might be will show
the decomposition between horizontal and vertical trade structures.
The standard procedure for decomposing3 VIIT and HIIT is to apply unit values
(UV).  A unit value is defined as turnover in exports or imports in ECU per metric
ton. A relative unit value (RUV) outside the range selected - in this case, 15 per cent
on either side of unity - qualifies the traded item as belonging to vertical intra-
industry trade:
GLviit, if   1.15 < 


 =
i
i
i UVM
UVX
RUV  < 0.85 (2)
where UVX stands for the unit value in exports, and UVM for the unit value in imports of a
single item.4
This application to the Grubel-Lloyd indices showed a clear VIIT dominated trade
structure (Table 2). VIIT accounted for between 84% (EU-Hungary) and 90% per cent
(EU-Slovakia) of trade in 2000. An advantage in quality for the EU compared with
the TE is particularly evident in liberalised trade. The shares of VIIT in panel A were
much greater than in panel B. IIT in panel A was almost completely vertical in EU
trade with all four countries – a feature that prompts questions concerning the usual
assessment of FDI and its effect on this kind of trade. Hungary attracted the highest
FDI per capita among TE countries. It is often assumed that FDI in particular
promotes IIT, and thus also raises the technological level of production, increasing
productivity and income. However, although FDI certainly contributes to
technological upgrading, the link between this effect and catching-up in income
terms cannot be taken as certain when FDI establishes or hardens VIIT structures.
                                                          
3  Paternity for the procedure can be attributed to Abd –El-Rahman(1984). Since Greenaway, Hine and Milner
(1994), examples of application of this methodology abound.
4 We can define RUV as a, where ] [αα +−∈ 1,1a  ; more rigorous ranges are also applied when
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1a ; the vertical can be considered superior vertical if [ [+∞+∈ ,1 αa , or inferior vertical if
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1,0a ; the parameter α is a dispersion factor, arbitrarily fixed, in general assumed equal to 0.15 or
alternatively α=0.25
11
Table 2: Shares of vertical intra-industry trade between EU(15) and TE(4), 1993,  1997, and 2000; % of
total intra-industry trade, adjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices
Year A+B A B
Czech Republic 1993 83.5 97.6 70.2
1997 83.5 95.2 65.2
2000 84.1 90.3 70.7
Hungary 1993 79.8 99.9 74.2
1997 82.0 99.7 74.1
2000 83.6 98.2 76.4
Poland 1993 88.0 95.8 78.1
1997 77.1 96.3 59.1
2000 87.3 91.1 81.3
Slovakia 1993 78.3 95.9 60.7
1997 75.9 90.4 53.6
2000 90.4 96.0 76.5
Source: Own calculations on EUROSTAT data.
Data for EU(15) 1993 include data for Austria, Sweden and Finland from 1995.
The basic assumption is that prices (unit values) are quality indicators of goods.
There are objections that can be made against the simple interpretation of VIIT as
expressing only relative quality differences. The economic theory of index numbers
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develops the conditions under which a unit value index reflects a change in the
quality vector of a bundle of commodities when prices are fixed. When prices are not
fixed, both quality and cost may have changed. A unit value higher than 1.15 may
reflect an export price higher than the import price because of either a cost
disadvantage or a quality advantage of the EU. Each scenario is rooted in a
completely different world: perfect or imperfect competition.
One procedure with which to roughly identify the appropriate advantage in traded items is to
link the individual relative unit values (RUVs) with the quantities traded, that is, the trade
balance of the items (Aiginger, 1997).5 We can identify four cases or examples important for
our selection procedure:
(1) If the RUVs > 1.15, the gap reflects a quality advantage for the EU, and the EU should
achieve a trade surplus (despite higher prices). Otherwise, the gap reflects a cost
disadvantage of the EU which is hard to reconcile with an export surplus. Hence, if
RUV>1.15, we assume that the EU exports are of higher quality than imports of the
same item. Intra-industry trade is governed by quality and technology. We can thus
formulate the remaining cases:
(2) If the RUV< 0.85 and the EU has recorded a deficit in trade, the TE is assumed to
have a quality advantage. In this case, the EU exports goods of lower quality than that
of imported goods. Again, intra-industry trade is governed by quality and technology.
(3) If the RUV>1.15 and the EU has recorded a deficit, the TE is assumed to have a cost
advantage. Intra-industry trade is determined by factor endowment and other cost
specific factors.
(4) If the RUV<0.85 and the EU has recorded a surplus, the EU is assumed to have a cost
advantage.
We applied this method to the adjusted indices and found that almost all VIIT trade
is linked with a quality advantage of the EU in panel A (Table 3). While a quality
advantage of the TE could be identified for 1993, we found that it disappeared by
1997 and 2000. Although the quality advantage of the EU tended to decline, the four
13
countries could not take advantage of this feature. The loss of quality advantage by
the EU and both of the TEs turned into appropriate gains of cost advantage. The
picture is somewhat different in panel B. First, the quality advantage of the EU was
not as great as in panel A. Second, it seems to have increased after 1997, when
liberalisation gained momentum.
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14
Table 3: The distribution of quality-based VIIT between EU and TEs (adjusted G-L indices)
EU TE
Panel A+B
Czech Republic 1993 0.328 0.027
1997 0.583 0.001
2000 0.435 0.018
Hungary 1993 0.084 0.114
1997 0.143 0.131
2000 0.142 0.114
Poland 1993 0.148 0.043
1997 0.206 0.027
2000 0.169 0.039
Slovak Republic 1993 0.193 0.019
1997 0.191 0.018
2000 0.251 0.010
Panel A
Czech Republic 1993 0.655 0.013
1997 0.583 0.001
2000 0.568 0.006
Hungary 1993 0.258 0.000
1997 0.558 0.000
2000 0.271 0.000
Poland 1993 0.625 0.000
1997 0.924 0.002
2000 0.279 0.058
Slovak Republic
1993 0.748 0.063
1997 0.584 0.000
2000 0.560 0.007
Panel B
Czech Republic 1993 0.195 0.042
1997 0.201 0.026
2000 0.244 0.034
Hungary 1993 0.065 0.145
1997 0.056 0.164
2000 0.103 0.148
Poland 1993 0.057 0.058
1997 0.041 0.032
2000 0.067 0.021
Slovak Republic 1993 0.105 0.014
1997 0.071 0.033
2000 0.075 0.,016
Source: Own calculations on EUROSTAT data.
Data for EU(15) 1993 include data for Austria, Sweden and Finland from 1995.
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We may draw two preliminary conclusions:
(1) VIIT structures are a prevalent feature in all trade, be it liberalised or non-liberalised, but
VIIT achieves significantly higher shares in liberalised trade.
VIIT structures are dominated by quality advantages of the EU, which increased in liberalised
trade over time. The disappearance of the TEs’ quality advantage in panel A in favour of
cost advantages is evidence of a quality-based product cycle. In this cycle, the EU
specialises in production at the high-quality end, and the TE at the low-quality end, of the
continuum of differentiated goods.
3. A review of IIT models and test results
3.1 Country and industry determinants
There is an abundant literature on the relationship between trade flows and country
and/or industry characteristics. The theoretical perspective behind these links is often
discussed as well as their empirical implementation. These studies typically construct
an index of intra-industry trade and investigate correlates of the index with country
and/or industry determinants. While these studies are certainly interesting, their
relationship to the theory of international trade is often tenuous and debatable.6 An
important exception is Helpman (1987), who developed some simple models of
monopolistic competition and tested some hypotheses directly motivated by the
theory. The empirical literature has focused on “testing” all or a subset of the
industry and country determinants of IIT predicted by theory, finding more
empirical support for country rather than industry factors.
The “country approach” focuses on how country characteristics explain IIT (Helpman,
1987; Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995). Assuming all intra-industry trade to be
horizontally differentiated, a negative relationship is expected to exist between IIT
and GDP per capita differences. A positive relationship is expected between IIT and
the minimum size of GDP in a pair of countries involved in trade, and a negative
                                                          
6 For a survey, see Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)
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relationship is expected with the maximum size of GDP in a pair of countries.
Helpman found that the data bear out these predictions.
Hummels and Levinsohn questioned the apparent empirical success of these models.
Their estimated regression  for basic comparison with Helpman‘s results was the
following:
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where s is the Grubel-Lloyd index for the bilateral trade of a country pair, j and k, with β1<0,
β2>0, and β3<0. They found rather weak evidence of a negative relationship between GDP
per capita differences and IIT shares in OLS regressions. When the explanatory power of their
regressions was improved by applying fixed effects, the sign of β1 turned positive and
remained significant. Hummels and Levinsohn attributed this result to the fact that the fixed
effects regressions control for the differences in distance and land endowments, which affect
the share of intra-industry trade, finding that the distance effect7 seems to be much stronger.
They concluded in their “in-conclusions” that “we find, at best, very mixed empirical support
for the theory. Contrary to factor differences explaining the share of intra-industry trade,
much of intra-industry trade appears to be specific to the country-pair”8.
The upshot is that fixed effects estimates drastically change the empirical role of
factor and income differences,9 an effect that emerges clearly even with random
effects estimates. The very mixed empirical support for the theory suggests that
much intra-industry trade is specific to country-pairs, rather than being explained by
factor/income differences.
                                                          
7 The empirical success of the gravity models is well known.
8 Hummels and Levinsohn, op.cit. p. 828.
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The “industry approach” constitutes a further extensive body of  literature on how
IIT varies across industries within countries, although empirical results in search of
country/industry determinants are not clearly related to the theory. Aturupane et al.
(1997) analysed IIT in EU-TE trade, where VIIT accounts for between 80 per cent and
90 per cent of total IIT, focusing on industry-specific determinants and expecting
country factors to be particularly important for HIIT. This was, however, not the
case. Only 1 out of 5 tested industry determinants yielded the expected sign for VIIT.
In two cases, the odd sign was obtained, and in the remaining cases the result was
hard to interpret owing to the ambiguity of the expected sign. For HIIT, three of the
five variables showed the expected sign. When country dummies were used,10  the
explanatory power of the regressions increased significantly for HIIT, but only
slightly for VIIT. The basic conclusion is that industry specific effects dominate VIIT.
When vertical differentiation is empirically important for ITT, country-specific effects
become irrelevant and VIIT is explained better by industry determinants than by
country ones.
We are now left with two problems: the first has to do with the obvious fact that VIIT
and HIIT are determined by different factors. What happens when the “country
approach” takes account of the stylised facts on intra-industry trade: that is, the
relative importance of VIIT in TE-EU (liberalised) trade ?  Hummels and Levinsohn
argued that the weak significance of the GDP per capita variable without fixed effects
and the change of the sign with fixed effects should be explained by country-pair
specifics. However, the result may also be consistent with models of intra-industry
trade in vertically differentiated products. The fixed effects may control for
differences across countries when it is VIIT, not HIIT, that matters.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Recall the long-standing debate on whether per capita income is a proxy for factor endowments or consumer
tastes. Empirical literature has interpreted differences in per capita income both as a demand side phenomenon as
in Bergstrand (1990), and as a proxy for differences in factor composition, in Helpman (1987).
10 But proxies for “country specific factors” are dummies. The use of country dummies is motivated by the
absence of reliable data on incomes and endowments for TE countries.
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The second problem is linked with the identification of additional changeable country factors
(instead of ‘unknown’ fixed effects) and with their explicit testing (instead of implicit testing
via country dummies) in order to find a better explanation of trade flow variations whenever
HIIT and VIIT are identified. The model of vertically differentiated intra-industry trade
developed by Flam and Helpman (1987) for a North-South context also offers an interesting
theoretical perspective on EU-TE trade by including income distribution in the pool of
country factors. A brief outline will illustrate the structure of the model.
3.2 A model with income distribution
The model explains the demand for different varieties of the same good as being due
to indivisibilities in consumption and variations in income across countries. The less
advanced country, say, the TE, produces a homogenous good and the low-quality
variety of the differentiated product, while the developed country, the EU in this
case, produces the high-quality variety. On the production side, both countries have
the same unit labour requirements to produce the homogeneous good but different
unit labour requirements to produce one unit of the differentiated good with quality
level q. Labour input requirements --  a(q) for the EU and a*(q) for the TE -- are
positive and convex in the quality level. Their ratio Z = a*(q)/a(q) is assumed to
increase in q since the EU has an absolute advantage in producing all quality levels
(see Graph 1). The reason why the EU does not produce the entire range of the
differentiated product is the possible comparative advantage of the TE in producing
part of the low quality variety. The problem is identifying the split between the two
regions of the “chain” of comparative advantages defined by quality levels with a
continuum of varieties q of the differentiated commodity. The model provides a
solution based on changes in the relative wage (due to productivity and quality
changes), on population growth, and on changes in income distribution.
The demand for a specific variety is associated with different income levels of
consumers. Those with higher effective labour endowments earn higher incomes and
demand higher quality varieties of the differentiated good. It is possible to describe
19
the distribution of income across households by density functions g for the EU, and
g* for the TE. These functions also denote the density of the distribution of effective
labour endowments across households.
There is a dividing income level at which consumers are indifferent towards a
marginal change of quality, but respond to changes in the relative price of varieties.
These consumers demand a quality qd. Consumers/households with higher incomes
purchase high-quality varieties gh, and those with lower incomes purchase low-
quality ones ql. Assuming a balanced trade, the model can be solved for the dividing
income class. The dividing income class determines not only the split in the demand
for quality in both countries, but also the relative wage per effective labour unit
ω=w/w* and a pattern of specialisation typical for Ricardian models with a continuum
of goods.
The explicit expression for the share of VIIT in total trade according to Flam and
Helpman is
)(*1
)(
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d
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where α is a parameter for consumer preferences (equal in both countries) and γ, γ* describe
the comparative advantage in the unit labour input functions. F(.) and F*(.) are the cumulative
distribution function in the EU and in the TE up to the consumer with the dividing income
level, which is in the interval [ ]1,...,,...0*, *dhhhh = .  The wage rate and the labour supply are
defined by w and w*, and L and L*, respectively. All EU households in the interval [ ]dhh ,1=
spend a share 
*γα
α
+  of their income wL on the imported low-quality variety. All TE
households in the interval [ ]1,* *dhh =  spend a share  γαα+  of their income w*L* on the high-
quality variety produced in the EU country.11
The income of the consumers/households which are indifferent towards quality is the
product of the wage ratio and the amount of effective labour offered by these
                                                          
11 The ratio between both shares yields the parameter term in expression (4).
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households. As shown by Graph 1, with density functions g for EU and g* for TE, for
an arbitrary relative wage ω, the TE  country exports the quality variety between ql
and qd, whereas the EU country produces and exports the quality variety between qd
and qh. Expression (4) describes how changes in the relative wage level, the labour
supply, and the dividing income class influence the share of (vertical) intra-industry
trade in total trade. The most interesting determinants are the changes in the relative
wage and in income distribution.
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Figure 1: The quality split
When productivity and  ω increase, the bold section A on the quality range will shift from the
EU to the TE country. With a given income distribution (density functions), a given labour supply, and
dividing income, this additional part will be produced and exported by the TE country, and consumed
by the EU country.
Assuming that the EU country improves productivity in its high-quality goods
industry, the prices of all qualities in the range qd and qh will fall. With increasing
demand for these qualities, demand for labour will increase, and so will the EU wage
rate w and the relative wage rate ω with labour supply given. The demand for the
low quality range, produced in the TE country, will decline. For EU producers, it
becomes profitable to abandon the lower section of the quality range and shift it to
the TE country, where cheap labour is available. As can be seen in Graph 1, the range
of qh, produced in the EU, has narrowed; and for ql, produced in the TE, it has
broadened. On the demand side, the income of households up to the dividing income
increases due to the higher wage rate. These households start to consume in addition
precisely a variety of the differentiated good that was formerly produced in the EU
*w
w=ω
Quality range q
Z(q)
g(.)
g*(.)
qd
ql qh
ϖ1
ϖ2
A
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and has been shifted to the TE country. A quality-based product cycle emerges that
finds expression in an increasing share of VIIT in total trade. In equation (4), the
numerator  increases due to the wage increase. The wage rate of the TE country w*
may have increased (and so the denominator), but it has done so less than in the EU
country. The shift of the lower-quality section of the differentiated good from the EU
country has added some higher productivity level to the quality-range in the TE
county, but this productivity level is considerably below the productivity level of the
high-quality range in the EU country.
Flam and Helpman show that some of the factors which affect the relative wage ω may
exert indirect effects on S via a change in the dividing income level. In the case
considered here, the falling price for the high-quality version would induce
households with the dividing income and indifferent to quality to demand the higher
quality. The dividing household income hd would fall, and so would F(hd) with the
effect of reducing VIIT. The same might happen in the TE country, only that 1-F*(hd)
would increase, and so too would total trade (in the denominator). This is, however,
an effect that cannot compensate completely for its cause.
Let us now assume that, in the TE, income distribution becomes more unequal, to the
detriment of the poorer households, and demand for imported goods increases.
Consumers in both countries now face a higher price level for qh.. EU  households
with the dividing income would react to higher prices for qh and shift their demand
to ql, which is produced in the TE. The price for the lower quality variety would
increase, and EU producers would find it profitable to shift production of the lower-
section of the high-quality range to the TE. With a new dividing income class, F(hd)
would increase. The same would happen in the TE because some of the consumers
with the dividing income would shift their demand to the low quality product.
Again, the dividing income increases, and F*(hd*) would follow suit. According to (4),
the share of VIIT in total trade would turn out to be higher.
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In the former case, the cause of all changes was an increase in productivity that may
give rise to a change in the dividing income class. In the latter case, the cause was
income redistribution, and the effect was the increase in productivity. In both cases
demonstrated, we find a product cycle based upon a shift of the lower end of the
quality range in the EU country to the upper end of the quality range in the TE
country. The productivity gap in both cases is not closed. Flam and Helpman also
show that the productivity increase in the poorer country needs to be decisively
higher than in the rich country if it is to compensate for the comparative advantage
in producing higher quality. Only then does the share of VIIT fall (and the share of
HIIT increase). The model explains why this higher productivity increase cannot be
achieved simply by shifting the lower end of the EU quality range to the TE.
Expression (4) may be a good candidate for disentangling different determinants of
both HIIT and VIIT in the EU-TE context, where the EU stands for a region of more
developed countries and the TE for a region of less developed ones. The model
predicts that the volume and share of VIIT between two countries will be positively
related to the difference in their wage rates and to the distance in income
distribution. Durkin and Krygier (2000) tested the model for US-OECD trade. They
found the expected signs and significant coefficients for GDP per capita (as a proxy
for the relative wage rate), income distribution, and distance (a variable not included
in the model), but they obtained ambiguous results for the size variable (as a proxy
for labour supply).
4. The results
The empirical form of equation (4) is
( )
( ) ,lnln,lnmax
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where TEEUs ,  is the share of intra-industry trade between a single EU country and a single TE
country in  trade. The share of intra-industry trade is calculated for the years 1997 and 2000 as
total IIT, HIIT and VIIT for each panel A and B and for the entire panel (A+B).12 We use
GDP per capita TE
TE
EU
EU
C
GDP
C
GDP −   as a proxy for the average wage (henceforth RELGDP);
this variable reports changes in the  relative difference between each pair of countries.
The next variable is a proxy for size. In most, but not all, cases min(lnGDP) stands for the TE
country, and max(lnGDP) for the EU country.13 We abbreviate the former as MINGDP, and
the latter as MAXGDP. All GDP data  are in US dollar terms based on the average exchange
rate. GDP and population data were taken from OECD (2001). ID represents differences in
income distribution between each pair of countries, and changes approximate shifts in the
dividing income level.
There is no income distribution variable in Hummels and Levinsohn, but there is a
specification with fixed effects. In Durkin and Krygier, income distribution, though
differently calculated, plays an important role, and there are spatial distances plus fixed
effects in addition.
Durkin and Krygier constructed the income distribution value by cumulating household
deciles in a US-OECD framework along the x-axis of the Lorenz curve setting. They set the
income of the lowest US quintile in purchasing power parity (PPS) as the overlapping income
class, assuming that household quintiles above this class demand higher quality and
households below it demand lower quality. The main problem with this and similar
approaches is a severe distortion caused by a possible gap between the average income of the
household class with highest incomes in TE countries and of the household class with lowest
incomes in EU countries – there would thus be no overlapping income class. This was
actually found in the EU-TE relationship, even in terms of PPS. To capture, first, differences
in income distribution between EU and TE countries, and avoiding exchange rate problems,
                                                          
12 We regressed the total VIIT data of Table 2 to the determinants and neglected our calculated quality based
VIIT data in Table 3. The latter provides only a rough idea of the quality advantage of the EU. Methodological
problems prevented us from using them in regressions.
13 Durkin and Krygier in their study on US-OECD trade rephrased max and min values into GDP(US)
and GDP(OECD) because the GDP of the US exceeded that of each OECD country. In our case, the
GDP of some TE countries exceeded that of some EU countries, for example in the Polish-Greek case,
and the min value is the Greek one while the max value is the Polish one.
25
and (second) changes in domestic income distribution14, we calculated decile ratios for each
country, and relative decile ratios for each country pair (see tables A2 and A3 in the Annex);
mean values report a strong drift to inequality in TE compared to EU countries (see figure A1
in the Annex). Data were taken from Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) with the exception of
Slovakia, for which country data were taken from official statistics. In all cases, data include
two years of comparison, not necessarily matching 1993, 1997 or 2000.  This may be an
additional source of distortions in estimations. Among all data the income distribution data set
is the weakest one, although this a problem general to empirical research including income
distribution data (see also Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
From the theoretical perspective identified for HIIT and VIIT, we expected the signs of the
coefficients to be as follows:
(1) an opposite relationship for HIIT (β1  < 0) and VIIT (β1  > 0) if per capita
GDP (RELGDP) and capital-labour ratios were correlated15
(2) a major role by income distribution in explaining VIIT (β4  > 0), whereas it
would have no role in the case of HIIT, and
(3) a positive impact on VIIT if the developed country/region was significantly
larger than the less advanced country (β3 > 0; β2  < 0)
Equation (5) was estimated using OLS for years 1997 and 2000, including and excluding
fixed effects.
In the first stage, we estimated a set of equations and compared the results with those that
Hummels and Levinsohn obtained for total IIT excluding income distribution (Table 4).
Testing unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices, we obtained the expected signs for VIIT in the
entire panel (A+B) for RELGDP (column 3). The explanatory power of the model (adj. R2 =
0.74) was high.  For HIIT (column 2), the wrong signs appeared. MINGDP remained
insignificant. We concluded that the model explains rather VIIT, accounting for the largest
share of intra-industry trade, and less HIIT
                                                          
14 For a very useful comparison among transition countries see Milanovic (1998,1999)
15 Consider the long-standing debate on whether per capita income is a proxy for factor endowments
or consumer tastes. The empirical literature has interpreted differences in per capita income both as a
demand side phenomenon, as in Bergstrand (1990), and as a proxy for differences in factor
composition, as in Helpman (1987).
26
Hummels and Levinsohn obtained a positive sign for the coefficient of the relative difference
variable  in explaining IIT with fixed effects regressions, and a negative sign without fixed
effects. They concluded that their mixed empirical results stand for country-pair specific
effects (for example distance) in explaining IIT, and not for factor endowment differences.
Our estimations did not yield mixed results: neither in panel (A+B) nor in panel A and panel
B, with and without fixed effects, did the sign of the RELGDP variable change from positive
to negative. We found empirical support for a positive relationship between relative GDP per
capita and VIIT, and therefore for the factor endowment explanation of VIIT.16
 However, from the theoretical perspective, it is well known that adjusted Grubel-Lloyd
indices should be preferred in estimations. When we tested the entire panel with adjusted
indices (columns 10-18), we again obtained the same signs of coefficients in both, including
and excluding fixed effects but in this case the model’s former explanatory power diminished
considerably, probably because of multicollinearity.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 For recent results see Díaz Mora (2002), who finds evidence that factor endowment and technology
differences in intra-EU trade are the driving force of (high quality) VIIT.
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Table 4: Regression results
Years 1997 and 2000; 12 EU countries and 4 TE countries
Dependent
Unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd
Panel A + B Panel A Panel B
IIT HIIT VIIT IIT HIIT VIIT IIT HIIT VIIT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Independents Including Ffixed effects
lnMAXGDP 0.195*** 1.003*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 1.131*** 0.200*** 0.299*** 1.041*** 0.312***
lnMINGDP 0.837 -1.970 0.753 0.571 -2.770 0.629 0.772 8.569** 0.262
lnRELGDP 0.832*** 2.410** 0.854*** 0.762** 1.073 0.836*** 1.390*** 2.565** 1.337***
CR-C -20.976 -19.758 -20.856 -17.479 -0.581 -18.855 -27.439 -135.830 -21.786
HU-C -21.427 -20.017 -20.856 -17.917 -2641 -19.321 -27.602 -135.367 -21.935
PL-C -22.605 -17.673 -21.971 -18.991 2.549 -20.496 -28.517 -145.430 -22.333
SL-C -20.991 -22.502 -20.537 -17.602 -4.448 -18.976 -28.155 -128.913 -23.194
corr. R2 0.670 0.160 0.740 0.510 0.079 0.548 0.374 0.172 0.322
Excluding fixed effects
Constante -11.637*** -42.430*** -12.199*** -8.633** -37.819** -9.537** -20.567*** -44.828*** -20.101***
lnMAXGDP 0.239*** 0.940*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 1.075*** 0.239*** 0.316*** 1.141*** 0.307***
lnMINGDP -0.106 0.303 -0.106 -0.275** 0.773* -0.284** 0.155 0.242 0.194
lnRELGDP 0.809*** 2.273** 0.850*** 0.699* 0.967 0.789** 1.315*** 2.309* 1.212***
corr. R2 0.510 0.170 0.570 0.390 0.054 0.407 0.271 0.135 0.166
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Adjusted Grubel-Lloyd
Panel A + B Panel A Panel B
IIT HIIT VIIT IIT HIIT VIIT IIT HIIT VIIT
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Independents Including fixed effects
lnMAXGDP 0.151*** 1.000*** 0.102 0.173*** 1.353*** 0.170*** 0.109 0.915*** 0.116
lnMINGDP -1.090 -4.305 -0.741 -0.779 -4.785 -0.711 0.248 0.9121** -0.205
lnRELGDP 0.460** 2.261** 0.324 0.463* 1.273 0.516* 0.967*** 2.263* 0.972***
CR-C 4.558 7.446 2.654 1.10 16.98 -0.17 -14.75 -137.03 -10.20
HU-C 3.879 6.668 2.737 0.94 14.63 -0.37 -15.08 -136.52 -10.51
PL-C 5.442 12.421 3.684 1.94 22.96 0.53 -15.26 -147.12 -10.25
SL-C 2.822 2.374 1.22 -0.02 11.09 -1.28 -15.85 -129.39 -11.94
corr. R2 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.24 0.14 0.25
Excluding fixed effects
Constante -8.615*** -44.660*** -7.431** -8.167*** -47.418*** -8.444*** -13.144*** -40.719*** -13.183***
lnMAXGDP 0.125** 0.925*** 0.083 0.158** 1.294*** 0.153** 0.115 1.027*** 0.105
lnMINGDP 0.172* 0.660** 0.242* 0.143 1.225** 0.126 0.141 0.215 0.170
lnRELGDP 0.405 2.165** 0.292 0.402 1.227 0447* 0.879*** 2.097 0.843**
corr. R2 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.12
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 %.
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In the second stage, the equations included the income distribution variable. We omit results
on the entire panel and focus on IIT and VIIT in Panel A and B (Table 5).
The regressions again yielded the expected signs for RELGDP, MAXGDP and ID in the case
of the unadjusted index. MINGDP turned out to have a positive sign instead of the expected
negative one; however, the variable was insignificant. RELGDP and MAXGDP were
significant, but not so income distribution. In panel B we found only RELGDP to be
significant. The estimation for panel B yielded similar results as for panel A, but only
RELGDP was significant. In addition, the explanatory power of the model was weaker.
The test with adjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices not only decreased the R2 as in Table 4 but
changed the sign of the income distribution variable. The inclusion of income distribution did
not affect the sign and the significance of RELGDP and MAXGDP in panel A. We conclude
that income distribution does not add greatly to the explanation of VIIT, but neither does it
reduce the explanatory power of the other variables.
 Table 5: Regression results when income distribution is included.
Years 1997 and 2000; 12 EU countries and 4 TE countries; fixed effects
Dependent
Adjusted Grubel-Lloyd Unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd
 Panel A Panel B Panel A                Panel B
 IIT VIIT IIT VIIT IIT VIIT IIT VIIT
Indep. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MAXGDP 0.138** 0.137** 0.128 0.129 0.207** 0.203** 0.314*** 0.321***
MINGDP -0.470 -0.387 0.116 -0.287 0.544 0.609 0.652 0.204
RELGDP 0.732*** 0.751*** 0.924***
0.957**
* 0.745** 0.822** 1.334*** 1.327***
ID -0.711*** -0.781*** 0.137 0.071 0.046 0.032 0.138 0.052
   CR-C -4.69 -5.83 -13.12 -9.32 -17.511 -18.516 -25.740 -21.161
   HU-C -4.43 -5.56 -13.53 -9.67 -18.559 -19.003 -25.991 -21.345
   PL-C -3.72 -4.97 -13.58 -9.32 -17.187 -20.157 -26.781 -21.653
   SL-C -5.62 -6.75 -14.32 -11.12 -17.045 -18.652 -26.550 -22.617
corr. R2 0.22 0.27 0.19 0.2 0.51 0.54 0.36 0.30
Observ. 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Significance levels: 10%,*5%,***1%.
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Some conclusions can now be drawn:
1). The  expected  opposite relationship between horizontal or vertical trade and RELGDP is
confirmed  for vertical trade. The results for horizontal trade are ambiguous because of the
marginal role of this component in EU-TE trade.
2). Confirmation is provided for the positive impact on VIIT whenever  the developed
country/region is significantly larger than the less advanced country. We offer two
explanations for this. The first relates to severe defects in the data base: income distribution
data belong rather to the category of ‘soft’ data, and international comparisons may be highly
distorted as a result. The second explanation concerns the question of which sign can really be
expected in the concrete EU-TE framework. Assume two countries which differ remarkably
in size. Greater inequality in the smaller country may only marginally affect prices in the
larger country. In this case, according to (4) the share of VIIT would shrink  rather than
increase.
3). The  major role of income distribution in explaining VIIT is not confirmed.
5. Concluding remarks
This study has found no confirmation for Hummels and Levinsohn’s conclusion that intra-
industry trade is decisively determined by country-pair specifics. When their model was tested
with EU-TE data, the shift from regressions including and excluding fixed effects did not
produce a change in the sign of any coefficient, particularly of the coefficient to the relative
income per capita variable. This prompts us to conclude that the probability of a sign change
may depend on the character of intra-industry trade. The probability may be small when IIT is
overwhelmingly vertical, as it was in the case that we analysed.
We also found that country determinants matter in explaining vertical intra-industry trade,
although we did not test explicitly for industry specific factors. Hence, the conclusion reached
by Aturupane et al. strikes us as somewhat ‘inconclusive’. The use of explicit country
determinants is always preferable to the use of country dummies.
Finally, we could not confirm the positive impact of income (re-)distribution on vertical intra-
industry trade that Durkin and Krygier found in their study. This may be either the result of a
weak database or a country size effect not captured in the model. In the latter case, the model
used is better suited to pairs of countries of similar size.
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What we did find was that after a seven–year-long period of trade liberalisation, the division
of labour between the EU and the TEs reflects a respective specialisation in low and high
quality goods with dominant quality advantages for the EU firms. Our analysis indicates that
this situation is due to two factors: first, the increasing or at least stagnating per capita income
differences between EU and TE countries; second, the increasing or almost stagnating size
(demand) differences between them. These two types of difference may have given rise to a
product-quality cycle in which firms find it profitable to produce the low end of the quality
spectrum in TE countries, and the high end of the spectrum in a EU country. It is not
important where the firms are located: EU firms may shift the production of a certain lower
quality via foreign direct investment to TE countries, or TE firms may decide to undertake
(domestic) investment in those qualities. Hence, the answer to our initial question of whether
TE firms can withstand competition on quality in the enlarged Union is ‘no’ – at least as
regards the past few years.
However, a product-cycle kind of trade17 is not in itself a process that leads TE countries into
a technology trap. The product-cycle includes the transfer of technology, capital and human
capital, and helps upgrade quality in the host country. These opportunities offered by the
product-cycle need only be exploited. Economic policy can mobilise resources to support
catching-up in quality, productivity and per capital income. Such policy should concentrate on
improving the domestic absorptive capacity of local firms in TE countries so that they can
move upwards along the quality spectrum. It should also enhance domestic factors like R&D
intensity, and investment in capital stock and human capital so that technology can be
mobilised.
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Annex: Trade and income distribution data and methods
(1) Trade
Panel A includes all four-digit CN categories of manufactured goods from CN
chapters 30, 33-38, 84, 86, and 88-90 whose trade was almost completely liberalised
immediately after the European Agreements with the EU came into effect. We found  100 4-
digit items for the Czech Republic, only 29 items for Hungary, 81 items for Poland, and 100
items for Slovakia. Trade between the EU and Hungary is somewhat different concerning
panel A. When the interim agreement came into force, customs duties of the Union were not
abolished, but instead reduced to two-thirds of the basic rate on 1 March 1992, and to one-
third on 1 January 1993. Tariffs were abolished from 1994 onwards. Hungary followed the
course taken by the other three countries with a one-year delay – which may be responsible
for some differences in price-quality gaps and in IIT and VIIT indices.
Panel B includes 137 four-digit items from CN chapters 50-63: mainly textiles and
clothing. Trade in these items was initially not liberalised (with few exceptions). It was
planned iberalisation would be completed six years after the agreement came into effect in
March 1992, and therefore by the end of 1998. Of course, each panels may include some
items which belong to the other one, or even to neither of them.
Panel B data also include subcontracting or outward processing trade (OPT). The
share of OPT in total EU imports in textiles and clothing was 29 per cent in 1996 (Pellegrin,
1998). The share in German imports from the four TE countries in chapters 62 and 63
(clothing) was 75 per cent for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, 85 per cent for Hungary,
and 90 per cent for Poland in 1996 (Möbius, 1998). OPT played an insigificant role in most of
the other chapters, particularly 80 to 90. In these ‘industries’, foreign direct investment
seemed to have a more influential role for trade structures than OPT.
Table A1: EU trade with TE 4. Some basic data
EU 1993 1997 2000
Total trade in mn Ecu
Exports 22255 59404 87280
Imports 17540 41649 73394
Balance 4715 17755 13886
Turnover 39795 101053 160674
Trade in Panel A+B in mn Ecu
Exports 6425 11829 30869
Imports 3709 5832 19554
Balance 2716 5997 11315
Turnover 10134 17661 50423
Trade in in Panel A+B % of total trade
Exports 28.9 19.9 35.4
Imports 21.1 14.0 26.6
Turnover 25.5 17.5 31.4
Source: Own calculation on EUROSTAT data.
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 (2) Income distribution
Table A2: Decile ratios and relative decile ratios for the base year (“1993”)
Base year Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
3.80 6.76 6.94 3.44EU Decile ratios of
countries Relative decile ratios of country pairs
Austria 4.61 0.83 1.47 1.50 0.75
Belgium 4.25 0.90 1.59 1.63 0.81
Denmark 5.22 0.73 1.30 1.33 0.66
Finland 4.19 0.91 1.62 1.66 0.82
France 7.60 0.50 0.89 0.91 0.45
Germany 5.28 0.72 1.28 1.31 0.65
Ireland 8.59 0.44 0.79 0.81 0.40
Italy 6.53 0.58 1.04 1.06 0.53
Netherlands 6.38 0.60 1.06 1.09 0.54
Sweden 5.11 0.74 1.32 1.36 0.67
Spain 8.75 0.43 0.77 0.79 0.39
UK 9.04 0.42 0.75 0.77 0.38
means 6.29 0.65 1.16 1.19 0.59
Note: For decile ratios, income shares of 10th over 1st deciles in individual countries.
Source: Own calculations on LIS data (except Slovakia); Slovakia: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic,
1999.
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Table A3: Decile ratios and relative decile ratios for the year of comparison (“1997”)
Year of
comparison
TE Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
EU 5.21 8.97 10.54 4.48Decile ratios
of countries
Relative decile ratios of country pairs
Austria 7.36 0.71 1.22 1.43 0.61
Belgium 5.70 0.91 1.57 1.85 0.79
Denmark 4.43 1.18 2.02 2.38 1.01
Finland 4.43 1.18 2.02 2.38 1.01
France 6.53 0.80 1.37 1.61 0.69
Germany 6.03 0.87 1.49 1.75 0.74
Ireland 8.59 0.61 1.04 1.23 0.52
Italy 11.59 0.45 0.77 0.91 0.39
Netherlands 6.42 0.81 1.40 1.64 0.70
Sweden 5.25 0.99 1.71 2.01 0.85
Spain 7.61 0.68 1.18 1.38 0.59
UK 10.00 0.52 0.90 1.05 0.45
Mean 6.99 0.81 1.39 1.64 0.70
Source: Own calculations on LIS data (except Slovakia); Slovakia: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic,
1999.
Note: For decile ratios, income shares of 10th over 1st deciles in individual countries.
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Figure A1: Relative decile ratios (means of TE countries over EU-13 countries)a
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Source: Own calculations on LIS data.
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